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Drives a real browser through the omowright library from the js eval kernel: sites the user is already signed into, forms and clicks, JS-rendered pages, screenshots, web QA, extension popups, a human handoff for login, CAPTCHA or OTP, and a browser you own for scraping, bot-scored targets, network capture and QA traces. Use for any interactive browser task; not for a plain search or an unblocked static fetch.

code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent Agent Skills author: code-yeongyu NOASSERTION 15 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 2 083 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 10 h ago

Drives a real browser through the omowright library from the js eval kernel: sites the user is already signed into, forms and clicks, JS-rendered pages…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorSoftware developmentAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/browser-engine-guard.mjs:310
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      if (SENDING_CHORD.test(key)) return confirm("press", `press ${key}, which sends in many apps`)
      security skill

    Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 10 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2083 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 412: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    In the sandbox The scripts kept to themselves

    The skill's scripts were run in a throwaway machine: no network, fake keys in the home directory, a tracer watching. We wrote down what they did. Reaching for the network or for secrets caps the technical grade at C; a quiet run adds no points.

    Запущено 4 скрипта; каждому дали двадцать секунд, поддельный домашний каталог с ключами и сеть, в которой ничего нет.

    scripts/browser-doctor.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
    scripts/browser-engine-guard.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
    scripts/browser-install.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
    scripts/omowright.mjsничего за пределами своей папки

    5 Oct 2026