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AB clip-aware-embeddings

Semantic image-text matching with CLIP and alternatives. Use for image search, zero-shot classification, similarity matching. NOT for counting objects, fine-grained classification (celebrities, car models), spatial reasoning, or compositional queries. Activate on "CLIP", "embeddings", "image similarity", "semantic search", "zero-shot classification", "image-text matching".

curiositech/some_claude_skills Agent Skills author: curiositech 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 106 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 39 min ago

Semantic image-text matching with CLIP and alternatives.

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
96
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 42 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2106 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 375: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 30 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
    • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 96.