BC docker-containerization
Write production-grade Dockerfiles, docker-compose configurations, multi-stage builds, and container optimization. Activate on "Dockerfile", "docker", "docker-compose", "container", "multi-stage build", "docker image", "container optimization", "docker security". NOT for Kubernetes orchestration, cloud-specific container services (ECS, Cloud Run), or CI/CD pipelines (use github-actions-pipeline-builder).
Write production-grade Dockerfiles, docker-compose configurations, multi-stage builds, and container optimization.
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-install-from-urlreferences/multi-stage-patterns.md:258Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation of a security skill)npm install --registry https://npm.company.com/
security skill -
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Grep Glob
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2963 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 8 example trigger phrases
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 407: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 23 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 95.