BB microservices-patterns
Microservice architecture patterns — service decomposition, inter-service communication, API gateway, saga pattern, event-driven architecture, service mesh, circuit breaker, CQRS, event sourcing. Activate on "microservices", "service decomposition", "saga pattern", "API gateway", "event-driven", "service mesh", "circuit breaker", "CQRS", "event sourcing", "bounded context", "strangler fig", "distributed transactions", "choreography vs orchestration". NOT for monolith design, serverless functions, or Kubernetes infrastructure.
Microservice architecture patterns — service decomposition, inter-service communication, API gateway, saga pattern, event-driven architecture, service mesh…
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Grep Glob
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5235 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5235 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 39 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 12 example trigger phrases
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 531: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 33 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
- +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.