SKILLEMALL.ai

CD Fabric

Our ideal-state ports of the most-used Fabric patterns, each an intent with its own Assay suite and code checker that beat the upstream prompt head to head (security, reasoning, reading, engineering, writing), plus every other Fabric pattern run natively from Patterns/. USE WHEN word summary, ws, N levels, fabric, fabric pattern, run fabric, update patterns, any Fabric pattern name, threat report, threat scenarios, security finding, analyze logs, malware, incident, semgrep rule, sigma rules, nuclei template, email headers, terraform plan, analyze claims, logical fallacies, falsifiable, compare and contrast, analyze paper, summarize, meeting summary, extract insights, extract ideas, extract references, design document, explain code, review design, pull request description, commit message, code rules, analyze prose, threat model, mermaid, STRIDE. NOT FOR multi-agent investigation (Research) or content-adaptive extraction (ExtractWisdom).

danielmiessler/Personal_AI_Infrastructure Agent Skills author: danielmiessler MIT 80 files body ≈ 4 120 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 28 h ago

Our ideal-state ports of the most-used Fabric patterns, each an intent with its own Assay suite and code checker that beat the upstream prompt head to head…

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — References files that are not bundled: Setup.md

AnalyzerTerraformYouTubeSoftware developmentWriting and documentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
References files that are not bundled: Setup.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeIncident.md:23
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - The Atomic Red Team entries name only techniques from the ATT&CK list. Each entry is a testing objective a defender could run tomorrow: the system or control in this incident to run that technique's
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeIncident.md:38
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Never a manual check presented as an Atomic Red Team test, and never an atomic named that is not certain to exist.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeIncident.md:84
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Attack type:** {e.g. Ransomware}
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeIncident.md:101
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Atomic Red Team tests:**
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeIncident.md:112
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    Any field the source leaves empty reads `Not stated`; a field the source says is absent reads `None (…)`; conflicting reports read as each version with its source. When the source describes too little
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeMalware.md:70
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Malware Analysis: {sample, family or campaign}
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/AnalyzeThreatReport.md:11
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - The extraction covers what the principal wants from this input, inferred before a word is written and never asked for. A pasted report, advisory, write-up or dump of report text means every item wor
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Intents/CyberSummary.md:9
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - The briefing covers what the principal wants from this input, inferred before a word is written and never asked for. A pasted artifact (a digest, newsletter, advisory, report or feed dump), a file o
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:45
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
    | **AnalyzeThreatReport** | "analyze this threat report", "just the trends from this report", "extract the commands from this pentest writeup", `analyze_threat_report`, `analyze_threat_report_cmds`, `
    table
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:47
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
    | **ReportFinding** | "write a pentest finding for this", "turn this scan output into a report finding", "improve this security finding", `create_report_finding`, `improve_report_finding` | `Intents/R
    table
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:58
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
    | **ExtractPoc** | "extract the proof of concept", "pull the PoC from this bug bounty report", "what command validates this vulnerability", `extract_poc` | `Intents/ExtractPoc.md` |
    table

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: Setup.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "evals"

Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: Setup.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: Setup.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 24 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4120 tokens
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Description length 949: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.