SKILLEMALL.ai

CC Research

Multi-agent web research with verified URLs and confidence-tagged output at four depths. USE WHEN research, do research, quick research, extensive research, deep investigation, find information, investigate, extract alpha, analyze content, retrieve content, AI trends, enhance content, extract knowledge, web scraping, YouTube extraction, map landscape, competitive analysis, find it, find this, find this product, identify this, what is this, what's that thing, track down, locate, help me find, I can't find X online, can't find it online, source this, best X in a place, what's good in <city>, trip or itinerary planning, things to do, is X open, hours, where is X, venue or resort policies — never substitute raw WebSearch/WebFetch for a find/identify/investigate/look-up request. NOT FOR entity background, papers (ArXiv), JSON entity extraction, wisdom extraction (ExtractWisdom), raw page fetching or crawling (BrightData).

danielmiessler/Personal_AI_Infrastructure Agent Skills author: danielmiessler MIT 26 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 3 468 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 h ago

Multi-agent web research with verified URLs and confidence-tagged output at four depths.

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerYouTubeAI and agentsMedia and videoResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SourceRoutingProtocol.md:144
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $X_BEARER_TOKEN" \
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use Intents/StandardResearch.md:39
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **Signal fires → sentiment-mode routing.** Walk the API-first cascade in `../SourceRoutingProtocol.md`, adding the community calls to the same launch message: **(a)** the Reddit JSON API against 2-3
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SourceRoutingProtocol.md:85
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      2. **X / Twitter.** Fastest reaction window (first 6 hours post-event). Tier-1 path is an installed X reader/search skill if one exists (check local skills first); otherwise X API v2 recent-search via
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SourceRoutingProtocol.md:128
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      curl -s "https://www.googleapis.com/youtube/v3/search?part=…&q=…&maxResults=10&type=video&order=…&key=…"
      known servicequoted
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SourceRoutingProtocol.md:128
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service)
      curl -s "https://www.googleapis.com/youtube/v3/search?part=…&q=…&maxResults=10&type=video&order=…&key=…"
      known service
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SourceRoutingProtocol.md:130
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      curl -s "https://www.googleapis.com/youtube/v3/commentThreads?part=…&videoId={id}&maxResults=100&order=…&key=…"
      known servicequoted
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SourceRoutingProtocol.md:130
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service)
      curl -s "https://www.googleapis.com/youtube/v3/commentThreads?part=…&videoId={id}&maxResults=100&order=…&key=…"
      known service
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Templates/ThreatLandscape.md:24
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - HIGH: Prolific ransomware groups, actors with recent high-profile breaches
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Templates/ThreatLandscape.md:54
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - "ransomware trends [year]"
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security Templates/ThreatLandscape.md:230
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Type:** {RAT/Ransomware/Loader/C2 Framework/Exploit Kit/Offensive Tool}

    Files scanned: 26. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "evals"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3468 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Description length 930: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.