SKILLEMALL.ai

BB ThreatModel

Defensive threat modeling of your own estate: sensitive-data map, trust boundaries, compromise scenarios, a scored risk register via CLI. USE WHEN run a full security audit, security audit, how exposed am I, threat model, risk register, risk assessment, what if X got hacked, compromise scenario, blast radius, sensitive data map, data classification, add a risk, accept a risk, injection surfaces, trust boundaries, lethal trifecta. NOT FOR pentesting (a private-only offensive skill), futures or stress-testing an idea (RedTeam, Research), running IR.

danielmiessler/Personal_AI_Infrastructure Agent Skills author: danielmiessler MIT 9 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 029 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 27 h ago

Defensive threat modeling of your own estate: sensitive-data map, trust boundaries, compromise scenarios, a scored risk register via CLI.

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      description: Defensive threat modeling of your own estate: sensitive-data map, trust boundaries, compromise scenarios, a scored risk register via CLI. USE WHEN run a full security audit, security audi
      detector

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 9, column 14: description: Defensive threat modeling of your own estate: sensitive-data map, … ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2029 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 553: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.