BC Active Directory Attacks
This skill should be used when the user asks to "attack Active Directory", "exploit AD", "Kerberoasting", "DCSync", "pass-the-hash", "BloodHound enumeration", "Golden Ticket", "Silver Ticket", "AS-REP roasting", "NTLM relay", or needs guidance on Windows domain penetration testing.
This skill should be used when the user asks to "attack Active Directory", "exploit AD", "Kerberoasting", "DCSync", "pass-the-hash", "BloodHound enumeration"…
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice
The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: This skill should be used when the user asks to "attack Active Directory", "exploit AD", "Kerberoasting", "DCSync", "pass-the-hash", "BloodHound enumeration", "Golden Ticket", "Silver Tic
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:13Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Provide comprehensive techniques for attacking Microsoft Active Directory environments. Covers reconnaissance, credential harvesting, Kerberos attacks, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and doma
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:110Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Password Spraying
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:326Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Lock out accounts with excessive password spraying
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Active Directory Attacks) differs from the folder (active-directory-attacks)
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2281 tokens
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 282: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 36 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.