SKILLEMALL.ai

CC bb-local-toolkit

Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词:漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 18 120 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 h ago

Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

ProcedureGitHubAWSSoftware developmentInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
35
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Execution cost w 6
10
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:7
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Bug Bounty Master Workflow
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:60
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    **When you find bug A, systematically hunt for B and C nearby.** This is one of the most powerful methodologies in bug bounty. Single bugs pay. Chains pay 3-10x more.
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:527
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - IDOR + Admin endpoint = Critical (privilege escalation)
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:603
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | Zip slip | `../../etc/cron.d/shell` in filename inside archive |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:745
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | ASI04 | Privilege escalation | Use AI to access admin-only tools -- agent has broader perms than user |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:953
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - [ ] **Self-hosted runners in public repos** — untrusted PRs execute on org infrastructure = container escape → lateral movement
    detector

A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1764 chars, limit 1024
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 18120 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note description-budget description takes 1764 of the ~15000-char shared budget for all skills
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 429): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 18120 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 236 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 62 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1764: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 154 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 236 items
  • +4Has examples (66 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 35.