AC enterprise-vpn-attack
External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials, configuration-disclosure paths, pre-auth RCE/SSRF/path-traversal exploits where applicable. Built from authorized-engagement Cisco ASA testing plus 2024-2026 enterprise VPN CVE landscape. Use whenever the target's perimeter exposes any SSL VPN appliance or remote-access gateway — these are the most common initial-access points in 2024-2026 actor TTPs.
External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect…
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:107Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| **CVE-…481** | RAVPN | DoS via crafted handshake | **SKIP in red team — disruptive** |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:326Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- **Don't run pre-auth-RCE PoCs in red team without explicit OK** — accidentally bricking a VPN concentrator = catastrophic for the client. Detection-only tests first, then escalate with permission.
detector
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "report_count"
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4084 tokens
- 100Steps. 31 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 673: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 26 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
- +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.