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Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 4 322 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 h ago

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pullrequesttarget Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC…

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubGitLabTerraformAWSInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4322 tokens
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 504: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.