AC hunt-dispatch
Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.
Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator.
As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)description: Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:72Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## step 1 — fingerprint (red team only)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:151Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)(credential → lateral movement)
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low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:269Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -sS -m 12 -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:299Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)loaded for red team: {N} skills -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:372Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **`bb-methodology`** — When PART 0 mode confirmation completes. Workflow primitive: `bb-methodology` confirms engagement type (red team vs WAPT vs bug bounty); the answer feeds directly into this sk
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "report_count"
Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4287 tokens
- 100Steps. 21 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 328: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
- +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.