BB hunt-race-condition
Hunting skill for race condition vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern HTTP/2 single-packet attack cases (James Kettle DEF CON 2023 "Smashing the State Machine"; RyotaK / Flatt Security 10,000-request first-sequence-sync expansion 2024). Covers coupon double-redemption, gift-card double-spend, MFA-OTP-validate race, account-create race, faucet/crypto token double-mint, email-activation race, vote/upvote inflation, password-reset token race, rate-limit bypass via concurrent requests. Use when hunting race conditions, TOCTOU bugs, MFA-bypass-via-timing.
Hunting skill for race condition vulnerabilities.
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Hunting skill for race condition vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern HTTP/2 single-packet attack cases (James Kettle DEF CON 2023 "Smashing the State
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:38Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Privilege escalation** — racing role assignment or permission checks during user creation/upgrade flows
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:260Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)A bug bounty platform's "popular reports" feature allowed upvotes to improve report visibility and researcher reputation scores. By sending ~15 parallel upvote requests for the same report using a sin
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 8609 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "report_count" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 75): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8609 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Steps. 104 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 593: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 36 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 104 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.