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BC hunt-rce

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting rce on any target.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 7 467 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities.

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureKubernetesGitHubSecuritySoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    description: Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting rce on any target.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    RCE vulnerabilities command the highest payouts in bug bounty programs because they grant attackers direct execution control over target infrastructure. The highest-value targets are:
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:34
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Enterprise server products** (GitHub Enterprise Server, self-hosted GitLab) — privilege escalation chains from low-privileged console roles to root SSH access consistently pay critical/high
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:401
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    Articulate the concrete impact: source code exfiltration, credential theft (database, API keys, cloud IAM), lateral movement to internal network, supply chain compromise of downstream users, data dest
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:411
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    An attacker with a low-privileged "Management Console Editor" account on a GitHub Enterprise Server instance identified that the syslog-ng configuration UI accepted a free-form "destination" field. By

A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7467 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 441, 459, 462): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7467 tokens
  • 85Steps. 79 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 79 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.