SKILLEMALL.ai

BD hunt-sharepoint

Hunt Microsoft SharePoint Server (2013/2016/2019/Subscription Edition) on-prem farms — anonymous endpoint enumeration, version disclosure, legacy SOAP login bypass (Authentication.asmx), ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770), SafeControl reflection enumeration via Picker.aspx, NTLM Type-2 AD topology disclosure, custom-branding module discovery, EoL farm permanent-CVE-window exploitation, FormDigest anonymous issuance, file-extension blocklist NOT-an-oracle pattern, custom-zone Forms auth bridging on-prem AD. Use when target has SharePoint headers (SPRequestGuid, X-MS-InvokeApp, X-SharePointHealthScore, MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices) or paths (/_layouts/15/, /_vti_bin/, /_api/, /_catalogs/).

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 7 813 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 3 h ago

Hunt Microsoft SharePoint Server (2013/2016/2019/Subscription Edition) on-prem farms — anonymous endpoint enumeration, version disclosure, legacy SOAP login…

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAWSSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:10
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    SharePoint Server (on-prem) is one of the richest enterprise attack surfaces in 2025-2026 bug bounty / red-team work. Three forces converge:
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:379
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Full ToolShell precondition chain (anon GET + anon FormDigest + anon POST + unencrypted VS) + EoL SP2013 → **Critical** (RCE via well-documented public exploit chain, no patch will ship)

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7813 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 8, 44, 64, 137, 147, 327): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7813 tokens
  • 85Steps. 69 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (21 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 710: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.