SKILLEMALL.ai

AC hunt-spa-api

Discover a single-page-app's hidden backend API from its public JS bundle, then test that API for broken access control / missing authentication. One of the highest-yield web plays in modern recon — SPAs ship their entire backend route map to the browser, and the API behind them is frequently missing the auth middleware the login page implies. Built from an authorized engagement where this play found an unauthenticated financial API that an ASM scan reporting hundreds of "Criticals" completely missed. Use whenever a target serves a JS-heavy SPA (React/Vue/Angular/Next), an "app"/"console"/"dashboard"/"portal" subdomain, or any `*api*` host shows up in recon. Leaked build artifacts (source maps / .env / .git / asset-manifest) are owned by hunt-source-leak; API version-inventory and behavioral diffing by hunt-shadow-api; this skill owns mapping a live SPA's backend routes from its JS bundle and testing them for broken access control / missing auth.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 1 971 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 h ago

Discover a single-page-app's hidden backend API from its public JS bundle, then test that API for broken access control / missing authentication.

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationSoftware developmentData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 27 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1971 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 960: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.