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AC hunt-websocket

Hunt WebSocket vulnerabilities — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH), missing/weak Origin validation on the WS handshake, no per-message authentication, message tampering, socket.io namespace/room authorization bypass, and handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling. Use when target has WebSocket endpoints (ws:// or wss://), socket.io / SignalR / Phoenix Channels, real-time features, chat, live dashboards, notifications, or trading platforms.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 4 492 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Hunt WebSocket vulnerabilities — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH), missing/weak Origin validation on the WS handshake, no per-message authentication…

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerData and analyticsSecurityCommercetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:264
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | No per-message auth | Send admin/privileged frames | Privilege escalation (Critical) |

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4492 tokens
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 439: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.