SKILLEMALL.ai

BD hunt-xxe

Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including SVG-upload XXE, Office-doc (PPTX/DOCX) XXE, SOAP XXE, SAML AssertionConsumer XXE, blind OOB XXE via DTD callback, parameter-entity XXE, XXE-to-LFI, XXE-to-SSRF, and XXE-to-RCE chains (Adobe Commerce CosmicSting CVE-2024-34102). Use when hunting XXE on any target — emphasis on OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate for blind cases.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 5 764 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 h ago

Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureWordPowerPointAWSExcelSoftware developmentSecurityData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    description: Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including SVG-upload XXE, Office-doc (PPTX/DOCX) XXE, SOAP XXE, SAML AssertionConsumer XXE, blind OOB XXE vi
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:10
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    XXE is a critical-severity vulnerability that consistently pays at the top of bug bounty scales ($5,000–$30,000+) due to its direct path to sensitive data exfiltration and SSRF. Highest-value targets:
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:260
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    <!-- Chunked transfer encoding to bypass WAF inspection -->
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:359
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Business impact**: Full internal service compromise across the majority of the production domain fleet; potential for credential theft and lateral movement.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:369
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Business impact**: Complete AWS credential compromise from a single authenticated API call, enabling privilege escalation from application-level user to cloud infrastructure administrator.

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5764 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 67, 222, 320, 326): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5764 tokens
  • 100Steps. 53 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 411: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.