BD hunt-xxe
Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including SVG-upload XXE, Office-doc (PPTX/DOCX) XXE, SOAP XXE, SAML AssertionConsumer XXE, blind OOB XXE via DTD callback, parameter-entity XXE, XXE-to-LFI, XXE-to-SSRF, and XXE-to-RCE chains (Adobe Commerce CosmicSting CVE-2024-34102). Use when hunting XXE on any target — emphasis on OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate for blind cases.
Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities.
As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including SVG-upload XXE, Office-doc (PPTX/DOCX) XXE, SOAP XXE, SAML AssertionConsumer XXE, blind OOB XXE vi
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)XXE is a critical-severity vulnerability that consistently pays at the top of bug bounty scales ($5,000–$30,000+) due to its direct path to sensitive data exfiltration and SSRF. Highest-value targets:
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:260Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)<!-- Chunked transfer encoding to bypass WAF inspection -->
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:359Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Business impact**: Full internal service compromise across the majority of the production domain fleet; potential for credential theft and lateral movement.
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:369Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Business impact**: Complete AWS credential compromise from a single authenticated API call, enabling privilege escalation from application-level user to cloud infrastructure administrator.
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5764 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "report_count" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 67, 222, 320, 326): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5764 tokens
- 100Steps. 53 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 411: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 34 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
- +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.