SKILLEMALL.ai

AB ios-redteam-pipeline

End-to-end iOS red-team pipeline — IPA acquisition (App Store extraction, TestFlight, enterprise/ad-hoc sideload), class-dump/Hopper/Ghidra static analysis, Info.plist + entitlements + Keychain secret extraction, App Transport Security (ATS) misconfig + certificate-pinning bypass (frida-ios-dump, objection, SSL Kill Switch 2), URL-scheme / Universal Link hijack, exported-service enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation. Companion to apk-redteam-pipeline for the iOS side of a mobile app catalogue. Use when target has an iOS app (App Store listing, TestFlight link, enterprise MDM distribution), when an IPA URL is found hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "iOS app" / "mobile app" in scope alongside an Apple developer account.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 3 424 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 h ago

End-to-end iOS red-team pipeline — IPA acquisition (App Store extraction, TestFlight, enterprise/ad-hoc sideload), class-dump/Hopper/Ghidra static analysis…

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureFirebaseAWSInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
96/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:14
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Bug bounty program lists iOS in scope

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 29, 160): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 25 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3424 tokens
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 750: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.