AC meme-coin-audit
Meme coin and token security audit — rug pull detection (honeypot, hidden mint, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass), Solana SPL token analysis (freeze authority, mint authority, metadata mutability), Token-2022 extension risks (transfer hooks, permanent delegate), DEX liquidity pool attacks (sandwich amplification, LP drain, bonding curve exploits), pump.fun/Raydium/Jupiter integration risks, and real exploit examples from 2024-2025. Use for any token audit, rug pull assessment, meme coin security review, or pre-investment due diligence.
Meme coin and token security audit — rug pull detection (honeypot, hidden mint, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass), Solana SPL token analysis (freeze…
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:176High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)address constant ROUTER = 0x7a…88D;
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:177High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)address constant WETH = 0xC0…Cc2;
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:280Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **`triage-validation`** — When deciding if a rug-pull finding qualifies as a bug bounty submission. Workflow primitive: many "rug vector" observations are pre-rug warnings, not exploitable bugs in a
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:283Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- **`bb-methodology`** — When confirming engagement mode. Workflow primitive: PART 0 separates "pre-investment due diligence" (this skill's primary use) from "Immunefi bug bounty submission" (differen
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:300High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)spl-token display <MINT_ADDRESS> --program-id Toke…uEb
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources"
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 43 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3579 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 541: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 24 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
- +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.