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DC offensive-osint

Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon. Concrete probes, wordlists, regexes, dorks, curl one-liners for: subdomain enum, GraphQL/Swagger/REST discovery, identity fabric (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 deep — Teams/SharePoint/OneDrive), cloud bucket enum (S3/GCS/Azure), CDN/WAF bypass, origin discovery, vendor fingerprinting (Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/PaloAlto/Cisco/VMware), CI/CD exposure, 48-pattern secret-scan catalog (AWS/GCP/GitHub/Stripe/Slack/Anthropic/OpenAI/Atlassian/DataDog/npm/PyPI), Postman workspaces, breach correlation (HudsonRock/HIBP/DeHashed/IntelX), TLS/JA3 audit, certificate transparency, JS endpoint extraction, package registry leaks, mobile/APK recon, sat imagery, sector-specific recon (healthcare DICOM, finance SWIFT, ICS/SCADA Modbus/BACnet). Detail content in 15 modular reference files, loaded on demand. Use for any authorized recon: scoping, asset discovery, attack-path mapping, secret triage, severity scoring.

Not recommendedlow grade D
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 21 files body ≈ 7 496 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 h ago

Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon.

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ProcedureSlackAWSGitHubAzureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
56/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
43
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 21

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 21
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/helpers-and-automation.md:132
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    ("RSA_PRIVKEY",          SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/helpers-and-automation.md:133
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    ("EC_PRIVKEY",           SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/helpers-and-automation.md:134
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    ("OPENSSH_PRIVKEY",      SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/secret-patterns.md:35
    Private key material (key header without key body; documentation table row)
    | 25 | RSA Private Key | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlytable
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/secret-patterns.md:36
    Private key material (key header without key body; documentation table row)
    | 26 | EC Private Key | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlytable
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/secret-patterns.md:37
    Private key material (key header without key body; documentation table row)
    | 27 | OpenSSH Private Key | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlytable
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key scripts/secret_scan.py:74
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    ("RSA_PRIVKEY",          SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key scripts/secret_scan.py:75
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    ("EC_PRIVKEY",           SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key scripts/secret_scan.py:76
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    ("OPENSSH_PRIVKEY",      SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    detectorheader only
  • low Secrets in code secret-aws-key references/helpers-and-automation.md:92
    AWS access key ID (placeholder value)
    echo "AKIA…PLE" | python3 secret_scan.py
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/identity-fabric.md:210
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination host is a configured variable; documentation of a security skill)
    curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://${STEM}-my.sharepoint.com/personal/${USER_TOKEN}/Documents/" -w '%{http_code}\n'
    variable hostsecurity skill
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/probes-and-wordlists.md:808
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | **VMware ESXi** | `/sdk`, `/ui/`, `/folder` | CVE-…974 (heap overflow → ESXiArgs ransomware, KEV). |
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/secret-validators.md:66
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
    x-api-key: sk-a…...
    placeholder
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/severity-matrix.md:69
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | VMware ESXi exposed without VPN | HIGH | Multiple CVEs (ESXiArgs ransomware vector). |
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/specialized-osint.md:15
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
    ### 29.1 Malware Analysis & Sandboxes
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-aws-key scripts/secret_scan.py:6
    AWS access key ID (placeholder value)
    echo "AKIA…PLE" | python3 secret_scan.py
    placeholder
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:8
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - external red team
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:9
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - red team external
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:12
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - bug bounty recon
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:13
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - bug bounty
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:133
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - bug bounty reference

Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7496 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 243, 247, 253, 254): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Steps. 76 steps, 5 vague phrases
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7496 tokens
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 984: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 76 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (15 of 15)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.