CC osint-methodology
Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments. Covers the 5-stage recon pipeline (seed discovery, asset expansion, enrichment, exposure analysis, reporting), asset-graph discipline with 29 asset types, severity rubric (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/INFO), confidence upgrade workflows, time budgeting, asset-level triage rules, scale-based tactics, identity-fabric mapping (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 Teams+SharePoint+OAuth), API and auth-map methodology, JavaScript deep analysis, mobile attack surface, cloud attack surface, breach×identity correlation, detectability tagging, detection-aware probing (back-off, persona rotation), read-only validator discipline, WAF/CDN bypass + origin discovery, vulnerability prioritization (CVE/EPSS/KEV), phishing infrastructure planning + pretext development, bug bounty submission templates, client deliverable templates with risk translation, threat-actor investigation (incl. RU/CN pivots), cryptocurrency tracing, image/video forensics, chronolocation. Use when planning or executing reconnaissance against authorized targets, mapping an organization's external attack surface, investigating a person/entity, tracing crypto flows, geolocating media, or performing attribution work.
Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments.
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost
How to improve
- Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 8
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:18Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- `external recon`, `external red team`, `bug bounty recon`, `attack surface management`, `ASM`, `perimeter recon`
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- `phishing infrastructure`, `pretext development`, `bug bounty submission`, `responsible disclosure`
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **§30 — Bug bounty submission templates** (HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, etc.)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)description: "Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments. Covers the 5-stage recon pipeline (seed discovery, asset expansion, enrichment
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- external red team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- red team external
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:15Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- bug bounty recon
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:42Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- bug bounty submission
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
description-longdescription is 1288 chars, limit 1024 - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 22865 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "triggers"
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 22865 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Steps. 511 steps, 8 vague phrases
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 35 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (57 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 1288: 120–800 characters recommended
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 160 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 511 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 47.