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BC redteam-mindset

Red-team operator discipline — the mindset corrections that separate offensive testing from defensive WAPT. Built from authorized red-team work where conservative defaults caused multiple findings to be missed and one to be incorrectly retracted. Use at the START of any red-team engagement and again whenever feeling stuck or considering "stopping" on a defended target. The single most important skill to load when scope is "external red team" not "bug bounty / WAPT".

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 6 824 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Red-team operator discipline — the mindset corrections that separate offensive testing from defensive WAPT.

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSecurityPersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    description: Red-team operator discipline — the mindset corrections that separate offensive testing from defensive WAPT. Built from authorized red-team work where conservative defaults caused multiple
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:11
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Engagement scope says "red team", "adversary emulation", "assume breach", "TIBER-style"
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:19
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Bug bounty programs (use bug-bounty skill — different scope rules)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:27
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Red team scope = "gain access, prove impact". Bug bounty / WAPT scope = "find a bug, write a report".**
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:137
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ## Mindset correction #3 — WAPT vs Red Team scope discipline

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6824 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6824 tokens
  • 85Steps. 170 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 470: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 170 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.