BF redteam-report-template
Client-facing red-team deliverable format — codifies the Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC structure used for external red-team engagements (not bug-bounty platform reports). Different audience, different tone, different cadence. Built from an authorized engagement deliverable where 14 findings were packaged into a 52KB MD + 2.2MB DOCX with 16 embedded screenshots. Use when the engagement is "external red team for an enterprise client" (not H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti), when generating the final report, when the client has specified a custom report format, or when packaging findings into DOCX/PDF.
Client-facing red-team deliverable format — codifies the Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC structure used for external…
As a process F 47/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: screenshots/F
How to improve
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: Client-facing red-team deliverable format — codifies the Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC structure used for external red-team engagements (not bug-bou
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:12Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Pentest reports going to a CISO / IT-Sec team (not a triager)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:254Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Bug bounty would reject most of these. Red-team deliverables embrace them — the client paid for the assessment to know.
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: screenshots/F - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "report_count"
Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100
- 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: screenshots/F
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 63 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3659 tokens
- low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 633: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 24 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 63 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.