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BD supply-chain-attack-recon

External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 10 304 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubDockerGitLabInfrastructureSecuritySoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:498
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Flow:** Cl0p ransomware affiliate (FIN11 / Lace Tempest) discovered an unauthenticated SQLi in Progress MOVEit Transfer, deployed the LEMURLOOT webshell, and exfiltrated files from every internet-
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:559
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Impact:** "Most critical vulnerability in a decade" per CISA Director Jen Easterly. Affected every major cloud, every Apache product, every Java enterprise stack. Ongoing mass exploitation by Cont

A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 10304 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 10304 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Steps. 152 steps, 5 vague phrases
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 689: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 44 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 152 items
  • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.