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BC vmware-vcenter-attack

VMware vSphere / vCenter Server external attack matrix — version fingerprinting, the high-impact CVE chain (CVE-2021-21972 vRealize unauth file upload, CVE-2021-21985 vSAN plugin RCE, CVE-2022-22954 Workspace ONE SSTI, CVE-2023-20887 Aria RCE, CVE-2024-37085 ESXi AD bypass, CVE-2023-34048 vCenter DCERPC OOB write APT-exploited), default credentials, SSO configuration disclosure, vmdir LDAP enumeration, ESXi Open SLP RCE history. ONLY for vCenter / Workspace ONE / Aria instances exposed to the internet — internal-network vCenter is out of scope per the external-only boundary. Use when recon shows port 443 with vCenter banner, `/ui` redirect, `/websso/SAML2/Metadata`, or VMware product fingerprints.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter Agent Skills author: elementalsouls 1 file body ≈ 7 486 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

VMware vSphere / vCenter Server external attack matrix — version fingerprinting, the high-impact CVE chain (CVE-2021-21972 vRealize unauth file upload…

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

IntegrationSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:55
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | **CVE-…085** | ESXi 7.0/8.0 < specific patch | AD group "ESX Admins" auto-admin bypass | High — Domain takeover→ESXi RCE, exploited in ransomware ops |
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:66
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **CVE-…992** | ESXi OpenSLP | Pre-auth use-after-free → RCE | Critical, ESXi ransomware vector |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:333
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### 8. CVE-…085 — ESXi Active Directory integration "ESX Admins" auth bypass (ransomware-favorite)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:337
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Disclosure:** Reported by Microsoft Threat Intelligence; advisory VMSA…013 published 2024-06-25. **Microsoft Security Blog** documents pre-patch exploitation by **Storm-0506 (Black Basta), S
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:338
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **References:** https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2024-0013.html ; https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/29/ransomware-operators-exploit-esxi-hypervisor-vulnerability-f

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7486 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 109, 112, 346, 362): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7486 tokens
  • 100Steps. 91 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 20 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 706: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 31 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 91 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.