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Scholarly research companion using Knows sidecar spec (.knows.yaml). Generates, validates, reviews, queries, and compares structured research-paper sidecars, and fetches them from knows.academy. Use for academic literature search, survey synthesis, paper authoring assistance, and peer review with token-efficient claim/evidence/relation access.

first-fluke/oh-my-agent Agent Skills author: first-fluke 9 files body ≈ 3 289 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 14 h ago

Scholarly research companion using Knows sidecar spec (.knows.yaml). Generates, validates, reviews, queries, and compares structured research-paper sidecars…

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureLaTeXResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url resources/execution-protocol.md:58
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      curl -s "https://api.openalex.org/works?search=…&api_key=…" \
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use resources/execution-protocol.md:58
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "https://api.openalex.org/works?search=…&api_key=…" \
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc resources/setup-openalex.md:45
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo '[ -f ~/.claude/.env ] && set -a && . ~/.claude/.env && set +a' >> ~/.zshrc
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url resources/setup-openalex.md:61
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      curl -s "https://api.openalex.org/works?search=…&api_key=…" \
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use resources/setup-openalex.md:61
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "https://api.openalex.org/works?search=…&api_key=…" \

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 79 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3289 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 345: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 36 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 79 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.