SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC aspire

Aspire skill covering the Aspire CLI, AppHost orchestration, service discovery, integrations, MCP server, VS Code extension, Dev Containers, GitHub Codespaces, templates, dashboard, and deployment. Use when the user asks to create, run, debug, configure, deploy, or troubleshoot an Aspire distributed application.

github/awesome-copilot Agent Skills author: github MIT 10 files body ≈ 2 247 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 23 h ago

Aspire skill covering the Aspire CLI, AppHost orchestration, service discovery, integrations, MCP server, VS Code extension, Dev Containers, GitHub…

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationGitHubVS CodeDockerAzureSoftware developmentInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: GitHub Copilot / VS Code Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/cli-reference.md:13
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -sSL https://aspire.dev/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/deployment.md:144
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      run: curl -sSL https://aspire.dev/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/deployment.md:171
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      - script: curl -sSL https://aspire.dev/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:102
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -sSL https://aspire.dev/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/deployment.md:229
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "postCreateCommand": "curl -sSL https://aspire.dev/install.sh | bash",
      vendor-hostquoted

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 14 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2247 tokens
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 313: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (9 of 9)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.