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AC batch-files

Expert-level Windows batch file (.bat/.cmd) skill for writing, debugging, and maintaining CMD scripts. Use when asked to "create a batch file", "write a .bat script", "automate a Windows task", "CMD scripting", "batch automation", "scheduled task script", "Windows shell script", or when working with .bat/.cmd files in the workspace. Covers cmd.exe syntax, environment variables, control flow, string processing, error handling, and integration with system tools.

github/awesome-copilot Agent Skills author: github MIT 10 files body ≈ 4 184 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 31 h ago

Expert-level Windows batch file (.bat/.cmd) skill for writing, debugging, and maintaining CMD scripts. Use when asked to "create a batch file", "write a .bat…

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: GitHub Copilot / VS Code Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/batch-files-and-functions.md:53
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      **Autoexec and AutoRun** — Autoexec.bat: legacy MS-DOS; under Windows, only SET statements in `C:\autoexec.bat` are parsed at boot. AutoRun commands: set `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor\Aut
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/batch-files-and-functions.md:274
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **SCHTASKS** — Full-featured task scheduler CLI (XP+). Subcommands: `/Create` (schedule new task), `/Delete`, `/Query`, `/Change`, `/Run` (run immediately), `/End` (stop running task), `/ShowSid`. C
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/batch-files-and-functions.md:212
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **Get Default Browser** — Manual: `START ms-settings:defaultapps`. Programmatic: read `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\UserChoice\ProgID` via `REG QUERY`, ret
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/tools-and-resources.md:79
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [CryptoPrevent](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/cryptolocker-ransomware-information)

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 287): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4184 tokens
    • 100Steps. 42 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 464: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 47 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
    • +4Has examples (22 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.