AC data-breach-blast-radius
Pre-breach impact analysis: inventories sensitive data (PII, PHI, PCI-DSS, credentials), traces data flows, scores exposure vectors, and produces a regulatory blast radius report with fine ranges sourced verbatim from GDPR Art. 83, CCPA § 1798.155(a), and HIPAA 45 CFR § 160.404. Cost benchmarks from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report (annually updated). All citations in references/SOURCES.md for verification. Use when asked: "assess breach impact", "what data could be exposed", "calculate blast radius", "data exposure analysis", "how bad would a breach be", "quantify data risk", "sensitive data inventory", "data flow security audit", "pre-breach assessment", "worst-case breach scenario", "breach readiness", "data risk report", "/data-breach-blast-radius". For any stack handling user data, health records, or financial information. Output labels law-sourced figures (exact) vs heuristic estimates (planning only). Does not replace legal counsel.
Pre-breach impact analysis: inventories sensitive data (PII, PHI, PCI-DSS, credentials), traces data flows, scores exposure vectors, and produces a regulatory…
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/blast-radius-calculator.md:49Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| 0.6 | **Moderate** | Requires privilege escalation or chaining with another bug; internal system with broad developer access |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:24Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Auditing a codebase before a security review or pentest
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
- 85Steps. 100 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3299 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 953: 120–800 characters recommended
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 13 example trigger phrases
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 100 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.