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AC mcp-security-audit

Audit MCP (Model Context Protocol) server configurations for security issues. Use this skill when: - Reviewing .mcp.json files for security risks - Checking MCP server args for hardcoded secrets or shell injection patterns - Validating that MCP servers use pinned versions (not @latest) - Detecting unpinned dependencies in MCP server configurations - Auditing which MCP servers a project registers and whether they're on an approved list - Checking for environment variable usage vs. hardcoded credentials in MCP configs - Any request like "is my MCP config secure?", "audit my MCP servers", or "check .mcp.json" keywords: [mcp, security, audit, secrets, shell-injection, supply-chain, governance]

github/awesome-copilot Agent Skills author: github MIT 1 file body ≈ 2 020 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 22 h ago

Audit MCP (Model Context Protocol) server configurations for security issues.

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: GitHub Copilot / VS Code Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
96/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:129
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      (r'>\s*/dev/tcp/', "TCP redirect (reverse shell pattern)"),
      detector

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2020 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 698: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.