SKILLEMALL.ai
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AB security-review

AI-powered codebase security scanner that reasons about code like a security researcher — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss. Use this skill when asked to scan code for security vulnerabilities, find bugs, check for SQL injection, XSS, command injection, exposed API keys, hardcoded secrets, insecure dependencies, access control issues, or any request like "is my code secure?", "review for security issues", "audit this codebase", or "check for vulnerabilities". Covers injection flaws, authentication and access control bugs, secrets exposure, weak cryptography, insecure dependencies, and business logic issues across JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Java, PHP, Go, Ruby, and Rust.

github/awesome-copilot Agent Skills author: github MIT 6 files body ≈ 2 055 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 24 h ago

AI-powered codebase security scanner that reasons about code like a security researcher — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and…

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: GitHub Copilot / VS Code Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/vuln-categories.md:174
      Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      private_key = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
      header onlyquoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-aws-key references/secret-patterns.md:161
      AWS access key ID (placeholder value)
      access_key = "AKIA…PLE"
      placeholder
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:84
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Privilege escalation paths

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 53): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 85Steps. 88 steps, 3 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2055 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 769: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 88 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.