SKILLEMALL.ai

AC threat-model-analyst

Full STRIDE-A threat model analysis and incremental update skill for repositories and systems. Supports two modes: (1) Single analysis — full STRIDE-A threat model of a repository, producing architecture overviews, DFD diagrams, STRIDE-A analysis, prioritized findings, and executive assessments. (2) Incremental analysis — takes a previous threat model report as baseline, compares the codebase at the latest (or a given commit), and produces an updated report with change tracking (new, resolved, still-present threats), STRIDE heatmap, findings diff, and an embedded HTML comparison. Only activate when the user explicitly requests a threat model analysis, incremental update, or invokes /threat-model-analyst directly.

github/awesome-copilot Agent Skills author: github MIT 17 files body ≈ 1 270 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 32 h ago

Full STRIDE-A threat model analysis and incremental update skill for repositories and systems.

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerSecurityData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/analysis-principles.md:173
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing authZ, privilege escalation, IDOR, CORS misconfig |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/analysis-principles.md:359
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Kubernetes services (any pod can reach them → lateral movement is realistic → keep T1)

    Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1270 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 722: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.