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CB officecli-word-form

Use this skill to create fillable Word forms (.docx) with real Content Controls (SDT) + legacy FormField checkboxes + MERGEFIELD mail-merge placeholders + document protection. Trigger on: 'fillable form', 'form fields', 'content controls', 'SDT', 'word form', 'fill in', 'only editable fields', 'protect document', 'onboarding form', 'HR intake', 'survey template', 'contract / SOW template', 'mail-merge template', 'compliance checklist', 'medical intake questionnaire'. Output is a single .docx where specific fields are editable and the rest is locked. This skill is INDEPENDENT, not a scene layer on docx — payload is `w:sdt` + `w:ffData` + `w:fldChar` + `documentProtection`, none of which docx base skill covers. Do NOT trigger for regular reports, letters, memos, academic papers, pitch decks, or any document with no user-fillable fields — route those to officecli-docx or its scene layers.

iOfficeAI/OfficeCLI Agent Skills author: iOfficeAI Apache-2.0 1 file body ≈ 11 416 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Use this skill to create fillable Word forms (.docx) with real Content Controls (SDT) + legacy FormField checkboxes + MERGEFIELD mail-merge placeholders +…

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, execution cost

GeneratorWordData and analyticsSecurityResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Execution cost w 6
40
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:18
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash
    vendor-host

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 11416 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 4, 38, 149, 170, 350, 661): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 11416 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 20 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
  • low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 898: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.