BB pr-push
Package the current working changes into a standards-compliant codex-proxy pull request: branch hygiene, commit message linting, CHANGELOG prompt, conventional commit, push, and `gh pr create` against the `dev` branch. TRIGGER when: user asks to "push a PR", "open a PR", "create PR", "ship this", "推 PR", "开 PR", "提交 PR". DO NOT TRIGGER when: user only wants to commit without pushing; user explicitly wants to push directly to main; user wants to merge, rebase, or close an existing PR (use `gh pr merge` / `gh pr close` directly).
Package the current working changes into a standards-compliant codex-proxy pull request: branch hygiene, commit message linting, CHANGELOG prompt…
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Edit Write Grep
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 48 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 57 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2086 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 533: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 57 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.