CB dod-rio
Knowledge base from the DoD Risk, Issue, and Opportunity (RIO) Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs (OUSD R&E, Sep 2023 incl. Change 2.2). Use for the defense-acquisition mechanics of program risk management: the RIO definitions (risk/issue/opportunity), the five-step risk process (plan-identify-analyze-mitigate-monitor), 1-5 likelihood/consequence scoring and the 5x5 risk matrix, the four mitigation options (accept/avoid/transfer/control), burn-down plans, issue management (probability=1), opportunity management toward should-cost, cross-program/interface risk, tailoring RIO to the six AAF acquisition pathways (UCA/MTA/MCA/Software/DBS/Services), specialized methods (RMF, MBCRA/Cyber Table Top, Agile metrics, FMECA, ITRA/DTRAM), and institutionalizing RIO via the PRMP, boards (RMB/JRMB/ROMB/RWG), tools, tiered roles, and WBS/IMP/IMS/EVM/TPM integration. This is the DoD-acquisition complement to nasa-risk (general CRM/RIDM theory) and dau-se-guidebook (the SE process frame). Does NOT teach general risk theory from scratch, and defers specialized risk regimes (system safety/ESOH, HSI, detailed cyber/RMF, spectrum) to their own DoD instructions and the relevant packs.
Knowledge base from the DoD Risk, Issue, and Opportunity (RIO) Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs (OUSD R&E, Sep 2023 incl.
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
How to improve
- Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitychapters/ch06-dod-rio-aaf-pathways-software-services.md:101Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)from development through sustainment, penetration testing, recurring assessments of the development
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitychapters/ch06-dod-rio-aaf-pathways-software-services.md:176Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)chain-of-custody, penetration testing, MBCRAs, and automated, maintained vulnerability scanning —
Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
description-longdescription is 1197 chars, limit 1024
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4074 tokens
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 57 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 1197: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 57 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.