SKILLEMALL.ai

BC nist-800-61

Knowledge base from NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 (Incident Response Recommendations for Cybersecurity Risk Management). Use for CSF 2.0-aligned incident response life cycles, IR roles, Community Profile priorities for DE/RS/RC and preparation, playbooks, coordination, and continuous improvement. Covers 800-61r3 only; does not replace CSF 2.0 full text, SP 800-61r2 tactical playbooks, or sector-specific breach-notification law.

jgsystemsconsulting/jgs-se-knowledge-packs Agent Skills author: jgsystemsconsulting 12 files body ≈ 1 455 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Knowledge base from NIST SP 800-61 Rev.

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security chapters/ch03-roles-policies-and-playbooks.md:34
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Unexercised procedures**: Documents that fail on first use during authentication outages or ransomware.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security chapters/ch03-roles-policies-and-playbooks.md:35
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - **Multiple IR teams without federation**: Inconsistent severity scoring and missed lateral movement.
      detector

    Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 49, 67): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 31 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1455 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 423: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.