CC log-analysis
Correlate auth.log, syslog, journald, application, and web logs to detect brute force, privilege escalation, and lateral movement.
Correlate auth.log, syslog, journald, application, and web logs to detect brute force, privilege escalation, and lateral movement.
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:60Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions- setuid binary execution via process accounting if available: `lastcomm 2>/dev/null`
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:4Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)description: "Correlate auth.log, syslog, journald, application, and web logs to detect brute force, privilege escalation, and lateral movement."
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:12Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)Correlates log data from multiple sources to identify attacker activity patterns including brute force login attempts, credential stuffing, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and data exfiltratio
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:20Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- "lateral movement" → log-based lateral movement detection
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:25Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Individual log sources tell fragments of a story. Correlating authentication logs, process accounting, web access logs, and application logs reveals the full attack chain: initial access method, persi
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:49Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Parse sudo and su events: privilege escalation timing, escalating users, target users
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "namespace" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "tools"
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 68 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2244 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 130: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 68 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.