SKILLEMALL.ai

DB weak-agent-test

Run the weak-agent adversarial test harness against docx-cli. Spawns weak exercise agents (Haiku by default, Sonnet to probe, or a local agent harness's pre-produced runs) to perform real document tasks over six scenarios — five editing (MNDA form-fill + font fidelity, invoice table-edit/restructure + logo replace, résumé styling, contract redlining + commenting, contract finalize via accept/reject + comment reply/resolve) and one authoring (T. S. Eliot poetry journal: multi-column, verse, footnotes, links, figure) — renders every result with Word, has opus judge them against ground-truth rubrics, measures each exercise's tool economy, token cost, wall-clock, and correctness (from transcripts for Claude, the exercise.json ledger for the local harness), and synthesizes a prioritized ergonomics report. Use when the user says 'adversarial review', 'test docx-cli with weak agents', 'run the haiku harness', 'weak agent test', or wants to re-run yesterday's adversarial process.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
kklimuk/docx-cli Agent Skills author: kklimuk 22 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 6 397 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 11 h ago

Run the weak-agent adversarial test harness against docx-cli.

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationWordAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
65
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user scenarios/contract-finalize/criteria.md:35
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    never anchored the reply, causing Word to silently delete it on next save.)
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Glob Workflow

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6397 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6397 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 28 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (16 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 986: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +3All 6 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.