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CC manager-setup

Manager mode: project hard delegation wall — status, install, upgrade, enable, disable, uninstall, purge, level; prompt codewords (++m, ++a, ++rr, ++r, +++) come from the brewmod-placeholders mod, not this skill. Triggers: manager, менеджер, hard mode, хард режим, delegate.

kochetkov-ma/claude-brewcode Claude Code author: kochetkov-ma 10 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 10 935 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Manager mode: project hard delegation wall — status, install, upgrade, enable, disable, uninstall, purge, level; prompt codewords (++m, ++a, ++rr, ++r, +++)…

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Bash AskUserQuestion Agent
  • medium Obfuscation uni-mixed-script-word SKILL.md:148
    Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (2 occurrences)
    **Arm-confirmation gate (every time, not only on ambiguity).** `install`, `enable` and `hard-one-shot` are the only actions that can write `state.hard=true`, an…

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 10935 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 6, 73, 333, 362, 363, 371): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 10935 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
  • low The response is described with custom markup (37 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +3Description length 274: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated
  • +2Bilingual instructions (RU + EN)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.