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BC swift-csp

Expert SWIFT Customer Security Programme (CSP) advisor covering the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF v2026). Use this skill whenever a user asks about SWIFT CSP, CSCF controls, SWIFT security attestation, KYC-SA portal, SWIFT architecture types (A1/A2/A3/A4/B), mandatory vs advisory controls, independent assessment, SWIFT secure zone, secure flow zone, MFA for operators, SWIFT messaging security, payment fraud prevention on SWIFT, gap analysis for CSCF, or compliance with SWIFT's 32 controls (25 mandatory, 7 advisory in v2026) across the three objectives: Secure Your Environment, Know and Limit Access, Detect and Respond. Control 2.4 (Back-Office Data Flow Security) is now mandatory in v2026. v2026 attestation window is July 1– December 31, 2026. Trigger for any SWIFT CSP or CSCF compliance question.

lawve-ai/awesome-legal-skills Agent Skills author: lawve-ai 5 files body ≈ 2 747 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 89 min ago

Expert SWIFT Customer Security Programme (CSP) advisor covering the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF v2026).

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, consistency

AnalyzerSecurityWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/swift-assessment.md:67
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Ransomware affecting the SWIFT zone
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/swift-controls.md:43
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 7.3A Penetration Testing | 🔶 | 🔶 | 🔶 | 🔶 | 🔶 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/swift-controls.md:478
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - **Alerting:** Automated alerts for: failed authentications, after-hours logins, large/unusual transactions, privilege escalation, config changes
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/swift-controls.md:537
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### Control 7.3A — Penetration Testing (Advisory)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/swift-controls.md:539
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      **Purpose:** Conduct penetration testing of the SWIFT environment to identify vulnerabilities not found by scanning.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/swift-controls.md:541
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      **Best practice:** Annual penetration test of SWIFT Secure Zone, including network perimeter, application layer (Alliance Access), and authentication mechanisms. Red-team exercise every 2–3 years.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:96
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | **7.3A** | Penetration Testing | Advisory | 3 |

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (swift-csp) differs from the folder (swift-csp-tanaji-hemant-naik)
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 23 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2747 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 821: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.