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Use when validating Azure DevOps pipeline changes for the VS Code build. Covers queueing builds, checking build status, viewing logs, and iterating on pipeline YAML changes without waiting for full CI runs.

The skillemall take

Promises to validate Azure DevOps pipelines for VS Code without waiting for full CI runs. Contains a TypeScript script confined to its folder and a config file. Checks flagged a dangerous command (high severity) plus one medium-or-low finding. Code quality scores 84, but process score dropped to 61 due to execution issues. Sandbox shows scripts stayed quiet within boundaries.

Don't install. The high-severity risk outweighs the convenience of quick validation. Revisit if the dangerous command gets fixed.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
microsoft/vscode Agent Skills author: microsoft MIT 2 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 912 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Covers queueing builds, checking build status, viewing logs, and iterating on pipeline YAML changes without waiting for full CI runs.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedureVS CodeAzureGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:26
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -sL https://aka.ms/InstallAzureCLIDeb | sudo bash
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:26
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    curl -sL https://aka.ms/InstallAzureCLIDeb | sudo bash

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 118, 282): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2912 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 206: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

In the sandbox The scripts kept to themselves

The skill's scripts were run in a throwaway machine: no network, fake keys in the home directory, a tracer watching. We wrote down what they did. Reaching for the network or for secrets caps the technical grade at C; a quiet run adds no points.

Запущено 1 скрипт; каждому дали двадцать секунд, поддельный домашний каталог с ключами и сеть, в которой ничего нет.

azure-pipeline.tsничего за пределами своей папки

3 Oct 2026