SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BD 1sec-security

Install, configure, and manage 1-SEC — an open-source, all-in-one cybersecurity platform (16 modules, single binary) on Linux servers and VPS instances. Use when the user asks to secure a server, install security monitoring, set up intrusion detection, harden a VPS, protect an AI agent host, or deploy endpoint defense. Covers installation, setup, enforcement presets, module configuration, alert management, and ongoing security operations.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 162 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Install, configure, and manage 1-SEC — an open-source, all-in-one cybersecurity platform (16 modules, single binary) on Linux servers and VPS instances.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerSlackGitHubDockerInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 21

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 21
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:194
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (documentation of a security skill)
      1sec config set webhook-url https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK --template slack
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/operations-runbook.md:120
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      url: "https://api.telegram.org/botYOUR_TOKEN/sendMessage"
      placeholder
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/operations-runbook.md:193
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo mv 1sec…d64 /usr/local/bin/1sec
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/vps-agent-guide.md:27
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo mv 1sec…d64 /usr/local/bin/1sec
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/vps-agent-guide.md:72
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Ransomware — kills processes and quarantines files at HIGH (`skip_approval: true`).
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/vps-agent-guide.md:126
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      url: "https://api.telegram.org/botYOUR_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage"
      placeholder
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/vps-agent-guide.md:238
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo mv 1sec…d64 /usr/local/bin/1sec
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SECURITY.md:132
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo rm /usr/local/bin/1sec
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SECURITY.md:138
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo rm -rf /etc/1sec
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:108
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - User wants intrusion detection, WAF, LLM firewall, or ransomware protection
      detector
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:131
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo mv 1sec…d64 /usr/local/bin/1sec
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:322
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 6 | Ransomware Interceptor | Encryption detection, canary files, wiper detection |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:325
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 9 | Identity Fabric | Synthetic identity, privilege escalation |
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:383
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo rm /usr/local/bin/1sec
      security skill

    A further 7 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 26 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3162 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 442: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.