CD agent-reach
Give your AI agent eyes to see the entire internet. Read and search across Twitter/X, Reddit, YouTube, GitHub, Bilibili, XiaoHongShu, RSS, and any web page — all from a single CLI. Use when: (1) reading content from URLs (tweets, Reddit posts, articles, videos), (2) searching across platforms (web, Twitter, Reddit, GitHub, YouTube, Bilibili, XiaoHongShu), (3) checking channel health or updating Agent Reach. Triggers: "search Twitter/Reddit/YouTube", "read this URL", "find posts about", "搜索", "读取", "查一下", "看看这个链接".
Give your AI agent eyes to see the entire internet.
As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-install-from-urlSKILL.md:26Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archivepip install https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:85Accesses a browser credential / cookie store- For Twitter cookies, recommend the user install [Cookie-Editor](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/cookie-editor/hlkenndednhfkekhgcdicdfddnkalmdm) Chrome extension
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 85Steps. 7 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 658 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 519: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 9 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.