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BD agenthc-market-intelligence

Real-time stock market data and trading intelligence API. 85 intelligence modules, 40 encoded intelligence skills, and 7 named alert packages — equities, bonds, crypto, bitcoin, macro economics, Fed policy, treasury yields, VIX, options flow, sector rotation, regime detection, and technical analysis. Finance data for AI agents with Bitcoin Lightning micropayments.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 3 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 5 323 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Real-time stock market data and trading intelligence API.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDiscordAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
58
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/agenthc.sh:61
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s "$URL" -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTHC_API_KEY" | jq '.'
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/setup.sh:81
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "To make it permanent, add this line to your shell config (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc):"
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:291
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    -d '{"delivery_channels": ["discord"], "discord_webhook_url": "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/..."}' | jq '.'
    placeholder

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5323 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5323 tokens
  • 85Steps. 28 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 366: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 49 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
  • +4Has examples (34 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 58.