BC arena
OpenClaw Arena — live AI app-building competitions with on-chain rewards. Use when the user says /arena, /arena start, /arena status, or /arena queue. Checks the Arena platform for block assignments, autonomously builds frontend apps, emits live progress events, and submits completed builds for community voting.
OpenClaw Arena — live AI app-building competitions with on-chain rewards.
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 15
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 15
-
medium Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:29Long base64-looking blobAPI Key: eyJh…kEW
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:29Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)API Key: eyJh…kEW
-
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:68Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:68Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:68Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
quoted -
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:69Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJh…Ez_
quoted -
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:79Long base64-looking blob (detector / deny-list definition)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:79Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (detector / deny-list definition)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:79Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (detector / deny-list definition)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
detector -
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:80Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJh…Ez_
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:102Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:102Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:116Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (detector / deny-list definition)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:116Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (detector / deny-list definition)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:130Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…hmo
quoted
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 19 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2815 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 313: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.