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BD autonomous-agent

CreditNexus x402 agent. Use when the user wants stock predictions, backtests, bank linking, or agent/borrower scores. Payment-protected MCP tools (run_prediction, run_backtest, link_bank_account, get_agent_reputation_score, get_borrower_score, and by-email variants) with x402 flow (Aptos + Base). Agent handles 402 → pay → retry autonomously. Supports wallet attestation (signing) for onboarding.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 46 files body ≈ 1 276 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

CreditNexus x402 agent.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: autonomous-agent (modbender/skill-library-mcp)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 11

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 11
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/agent/llm.js:9
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:38
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…nFR+MDik6udKfj2+9ZsmTLV0/t73v…I7L+1+yjEbQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:72
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…sgO+fnZo…ZmP+IDCXRtU/g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:82
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Hjp+geiw…y6u/TqkU…7R5/SMQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:147
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…TV6+QnX7…16S+X8zp…N8w==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:418
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…yhZ++8YtiK9d/3DBK…59X/P1Pf…EIg==",
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/lib/aptos/signPayment.js:38
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      'Aptos wallet private key is missing or invalid (expected 64 hex chars). Run setup-aptos.js or create_aptos_wallet first.'
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/lib/evm/signPayment.js:11
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const BASE_SEPOLIA_USDC = process.env.BASE_SEPOLIA_USDC || '0x03…F7e';
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/swap.js:7
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      *   node src/swap.js base eth 0x83…913 0.01
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/swap.js:67
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      node src/swap.js base eth 0x83…913 0.01        # Swap 0.01 ETH → USDC on Base
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/swap.js:68
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      node src/swap.js base 0x83…913 eth 100         # Swap 100 USDC → ETH on Base
      quoted

    Files scanned: 46. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (autonomous-agent) differs from the folder (autonomous)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 22 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1276 tokens
    • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 397: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.