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BC basename-agent

🏷️ Basename Agent - Onchain Identity + Æmail for AI. Register yourname.base.eth and get yourname@basemail.ai — via Donate Buy (recommended), free auto-register, or WalletConnect v2.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 4 files body ≈ 2 458 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

🏷️ Basename Agent - Onchain Identity + Æmail for AI.

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationPlaywrightAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/register-basename.js:16
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    *   PRIVATE_KEY           Wallet private key
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/wc-connect.js:19
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    *   PRIVATE_KEY           Wallet private key
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/register-basename.js:117
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('  PRIVATE_KEY    Wallet private key (REQUIRED)');
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/register-basename.js:166
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/wc-connect.js:168
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('  PRIVATE_KEY        Wallet private key (REQUIRED)');
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:54
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "contract": "0x8b…DE7"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:66
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const DONATE_BUY = '0x8b…DE7';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:67
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const L2_RESOLVER = '0x42…875';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:132
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | Contract | [`0x8b…DE7`](https://basescan.org/address/0x8b…DE7#code) |
    table

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2458 tokens
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -239 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 182: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.