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BC better-auth

Self-hosted auth for TypeScript/Cloudflare Workers with social auth, 2FA, passkeys, organizations, RBAC, and 15+ plugins. Requires Drizzle ORM or Kysely for D1 (no direct adapter). Self-hosted alternative to Clerk/Auth.js. Use when: self-hosting auth on D1, building OAuth provider, multi-tenant SaaS, or troubleshooting D1 adapter errors, session caching, rate limits, Expo crashes, additionalFields bugs.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 14 files · 1 script body ≈ 17 202 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Self-hosted auth for TypeScript/Cloudflare Workers with social auth, 2FA, passkeys, organizations, RBAC, and 15+ plugins.

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

IntegrationCloudflareStripeWriting and documentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key references/nextjs/postgres-example.ts:20
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Glob Grep

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 17202 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 17202 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 85Steps. 185 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 23 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -258 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 407: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 74 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 185 items
  • +4Has examples (67 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.