BC bitkit-cli
Bitcoin Lightning payment CLI for agents. Lowest LSP fees. Self-custody wallet with LNURL, typed exit codes, JSON envelope output, encrypted messaging, and daemon mode.
Bitcoin Lightning payment CLI for agents.
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, execution cost
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostREADME.md:37Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/synonymdev/bitkit-cli/main/install.sh | sh
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:17Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)**Install:** `curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/synonymdev/bitkit-cli/main/install.sh | sh`
quoted
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 10015 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 10015 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 14 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
- low The response is described with custom markup (29 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 168: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 62 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
- +4Has examples (93 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.